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CHANGING HOW WE BUDGET: 
AARON WILDA VSKY'S PERSPECTIVE 
L. R. Jones* 
ABSTRACT. This article chronicles the analysis of budget reform initiatives by 
Aaron Wildavsky and his collaborators. Wildavsky's views remain relevant to 
contemporary debate about federal budget reform. Initiatives to control spending 
and improve the use of analysis in budgeting were central to Wildavsky's 
arguments. While he characterized budgeting as incremental he also favored 
some comprehensive changes through "radical incrementalism." Wildavsky 
developed a behavioral theory of budgeting and believed that efforts to seek a 
normative theory were largely a waste of time. He offered reforms to control the 
deficit and reduce entitlement spending but understood the incentives that cause 
Congress and the executive to resist change. 
INTRODUCTION 
Aaron Wildavsky described and analyzed the dynamics of political 
behavior and budgetary culture over a period of thirty-two years. He 
informed us that politics is the art of compromise to produce a budget that 
distributes dissatisfaction relatively equally to the parties involved in 
negotiation. Wildavsky demonstrated that incrementalism inevitably 
results from the necessity for forging compromises over taxing and 
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spending policy in a democratic political system. Incremental change is 
slow, and it is not bad once you get used to it (Jones and McCaffery, 
1994; Wildavsky, 1978). Instead of pursuing radical reform, he cautioned 
that it is our expectations that need to change. We should neither want 
nor expect rapid and comprehensive budgetary reform. Still, this 
conclusion did not prevent Wildavsky from providing plenty of advice on 
how the budget process should be changed. The following two quotations 
provide insight into his perspective on budget reform: 
A large part of the literature on budgeting in the United States is 
concerned with reform. The goals of proposed reforms are couched 
in similar language -- economy, efficiency, improvement, or just 
better budgeting . . . However, any effective change in budgetary 
relationships must necessarily alter the outcomes of the budgetary 
process. Otherwise, why bother? Far from being a neutral matter 
of "better budgeting," proposed reforms inevitably contain important 
implications for the political system, that is, the "who gets what" of 
governmental decisions (Wildavsky, 1961: 186) . 
. . . [B]udgeting is a subsystem of politics, not visa versa - because of 
the current tendency to overload budgeting. As much as I respect the 
importance of budgeting and the talents of budgeteers, to substitute 
budgeting for governing will not work (Wildavsky, 1992b: 439). 
This article documents Wildavsky's views on budget theory, why he 
believed pursuit of normative theory was a waste of time, and what he 
objected to in proposals for positive theory. His main contribution was 
to provide the field with valid descriptive theory. Wildavsky believed that 
it was far better to comprehend budgeting through observation of the 
behavior of participants than to speculate over theoretical allocative issues. 
His theory was assembled on the basis of analyzing what people actually 
do in competition for resources rather than on classical prescriptions of 
what they ought to do or what rules they ought to follow. Wildavsky 
defended many of the classical and normative principles of budgeting but 
rejected others. Review of his work shows that he disagreed with a 
number of the principles identified by Howard (1973: 5) and others as 
necessary criteria for budgeting, including comprehensiveness, unity, 
exclusiveness and annuality. 
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Wildavsky concluded early in his career that successful agencies and 
budget advocates develop and execute planned budgetary strategies. They 
quantify outputs to the greatest extent possible, tie measures of 
accomplishment back to the previous year's base, and cultivate 
relationships with their political sponsors and budget controllers. 
Agencies that perform these tasks well gain a marginally larger share of 
the budgetary pie. At minimum, they are more likely to hold onto their 
share of the base when demand for their services diminishes. He also 
warned about the budgetary weight and momentum of "uncontrollables" --
entitlements that bear the stamp of moral obligation in a society that 
perceives itself as moral. He identified incentives and disincentives that 
cause participants in the budgetary process to behave as they do, and he 
showed that their behavior is "rational" from a competitive budgetary 
perspective (Wildavsky, 1964). He predicted the failure of reform 
justified on grounds of increased efficiency. Still, he believed procedural 
reform of the political process was needed so that better policy might 
emerge (Jones and McCaffery, 1994: 37). 
Wildavsky was positively disposed toward a number of specific 
procedural reforms. Among these were creation of the capacity to 
conduct high quality policy analysis in congressional and executive budget 
offices to evaluate decision alternatives. He also wanted reform to control 
budget deficits, and to create or sustain proper (i.e., constitutional) 
balance between the power of the executive and Congress in fiscal 
decision- making. Still, despite his investment of effort in arguing for 
reform, he reminded us that no change in the process of budgeting will 
alter the essential nature of the budgetary struggle for power and for 
money to spend on constituent programs. His work reinforced the 
egalitarian view that people make a difference in defining the outcomes 
of the budget process. Further, he showed that budgetary decisions are 
highly influenced by the rules of the game, and the rules often are 
changed to fit circumstances, i.e., substance inevitably triumphs over 
process. 
According to Wildavsky, we may lament the foibles of democratic 
decision-making on the budget but, the alternative to this convoluted and 
often confusing, disjointed and highly confrontational method of deciding 
is far worse than what we dislike. Congress is continually occupied with 
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"budgeting, budgeting, budgeting," Wildavsky informed us, yet 
institutional reform is resisted because it produces losers as well as 
winners. Both the risk averse and the wise in Congress and the executive 
understand why the devil they know is better than the one they do not. 
The budgetary game rewards those who know the rules and know how to 
play within them to win. Why change the game when you either know 
how to work the present rules to your gain, or are fearful that reform will 
cost whatever power you have managed to accumulate? Incremental 
change is safe whereas comprehensive reform is perceived as very risky. 
Incremental change tends to produce more predictable outcomes, and 
politicians and budgeteers prefer greater versus less certainty. The 
rewards of the status quo typically are sufficient to persuade budgetary 
process participants to resist comprehensive procedural change and to be 
suspicious of even marginal adjustments. 
Typically, advocates of serious budgetary process reform articulate 
the many miracles to be achieved through the institution of new 
procedures and processes. This was the case for PPBS, management and 
budgeting by objectives, zero-based budgeting, program-based 
performance budgeting, deficit control through "no-fault" budgeting, and 
service effort and accomplishments budgeting. The potential losers from 
reform assess their odds relative to the status quo, bend a little with the 
short-lived winds of change, then return to business as usual once each 
new budget fad has passed. Amid all this activity, real budgetary battles 
continue over who gets how much money for what programs, and where 
the money will be spent. This is Wildavsky's essential message with 
respect to why comprehensive budget reforms fail. 
BUDGETARY REFORM PROPOSAL 
The study of budgeting and budget reform, according to Wildavsky, 
had to begin with analysis of reform arguments advanced by recognized 
leaders in the field, e.g., Key and Smithies (Key, 1940; Smithies, 1955). 
His review of their arguments and the assumptions upon which they are 
based led him to conclude that efforts to define a normative theory of 
budgeting were not worth the effort. Wildavsky focused on the 
implications of V. 0. Key's statement of the question to be addressed by 
normative budget theory: "On what basis shall it be decided to allocate X 
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dollars to Activity A instead of Activity B" (Key, 1940: 1137). 
Wildavsky proclaimed the prospects for developing such theory to be dim, 
"No progress has been made for the excellent reason that the task, as 
posed, is impossible to fulfill" (Wildavsky, 1961: 190). In consideration 
of Smithies' reform proposals, Wildavsky found even more to criticize. 
Smithies had proposed a Joint (congressional) Budget Policy Committee 
empowered to consider all revenue and spending proposals in a single 
package, the expressed goal of which was to make congressional 
budgeting more rational and efficient. Wildavsky evaluated this approach 
and rejected it principally due to its ignorance of power politics, and also 
because of information problems that in his view could not be overcome. 
Senior members of this all powerful joint committee would, presumably, 
all be from safe districts or states and could, therefore, behave as "elitists" 
-- a very bad thing to Wildavsky, and far too similar to the British 
parliamentary method of budgeting. This committee could reject the 
views of others in Congress and, " ... could virtually ignore the President 
... and run the Executive branch so that it is accountable only to them" 
(Wildavsky, 1961: 186). And, no single committee could handle all of the 
information necessary to budget the entire federal government effectively. 
Wildavsky acknowledged the need for some degree of greater 
efficiency in budget decision-making in the executive and Congress but, 
he viewed efficiency in a different light than had Smithies and others. He 
defined efficiency in budgeting as maximizing budgetary benefits given a 
specified distribution of shares. Wildavsky was concerned that efforts to 
make budgeting more efficient would not be in the interest of most 
members of Congress and the tax-paying public. He observed that" ... the 
inevitable lack of full information and the disinclination of participants to 
utilize their political resources to the fullest extent ... leave broad areas of 
inertia and inattention ... to [public demand for] change" (Wildavsky, 
1961: 186) Wildavsky argued that "slack" as opposed to efficiency in 
budgeting provided room for "ingenuity and innovation." This in turn 
resulted in a more fair and democratic process and better decisions. A 
more decentralized and fragmented decision process typical of what 
Wildavsky (1988) termed traditional budgeting was a better option than 
a process dominated by a single congressional budget committee, "[m]ost 
practical budgeting may take place in a twilight zone between politics and 
efficiency" (Wildavsky, 1961: 187). 
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To Wildavsky, the approaches of Key, Smithies and others revealed, 
serious weakness in prevailing conceptions of the budget." In 
criticism of the literature on budgeting Wildavsky warned that reform 
should never be considered merely as a matter of procedural adjustment. 
"There is little or no realization among the reformers ... [and here he 
meant both analysts and advocates of change in academe and in Congress] 
that any effective change in budgeting relationships necessarily alter the 
outcomes of the budgetary process" (Wildavsky, 1961: 183). The search 
for a comprehensive normative theory was bound to fail because such a 
theory would prescribe, "... what the government ought to do" 
(Wildavsky, 1961: 184). However, it is not possible a priori and for all 
time to determine what problems government policy ought to try to solve 
or how programs should operate. Government policy and, consequently, 
the budget must change to respond to contingency. Unless this is so, 
Congress and the government would become unable to meet domestic 
constituent and foreign policy demands. 
Wildavsky was certain in condemnation of normative theory and less 
participatory and pluralistic budgetary decision processes, "[b]y 
suppressing dissent, totalitarian regimes enforce their normative theory of 
budgeting on others ... We reject this [as a response] to the problem of 
conflict in society and insist on democratic procedures" (Wildavsky, 
1961: 184). 
A DESCRIPTIVE AND BEHAVIORAL TIIEORY OF BUDGETING 
Instead of devoting effort to develop a normative theory of 
budgeting, Wildavsky called for good descriptive analysis of the actual 
process of budget negotiation and decision-making. Positive theory would 
emerge from application of a socio-political and behavioralist approach in 
research on budgeting. He employed participant observation and direct 
interviews with key players and decision-makers in the budget process. 
Wildavsky defined what a proper theory of budgeting would be and how 
it would be discovered: " ... it would not be fruitful to devise a measure ... 
[to] give an objective rank ordering of agency budget success in securing 
appropriations ... [because] the agency which succeeds in getting most of 
what it desires ... may be the one which is best at figuring out what it is 
likely to get. A better measure would be an agency's record in securing 
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appropriations calculated as percentages above or below the previous 
years' appropriations" (Wildavsky, 1961: 189). 
Wildavsky identified the base as the standard measure against which 
to measure marginal change. Still, he concluded, even this was too 
simplistic. Because of the potential impact of intervening external 
variables (Wildavsky, 1975: 65-68) including service demand, 
emergencies, advances in scientific knowledge, " ... beyond the control of 
an agency," measuring agency success or failure according to changes 
above or below the base were inadequate. Also, due to "affluence," which 
he defined as the size of the base relative to service demand obligations, 
and other variables internal to the agency, " ... some [programs] are doing 
very well and others quite poorly" that are difficult to measure and 
explain, "it would be necessary to validate the measure (the size of the 
increment) by an intensive study of each agency's appropriation 
history ... " (Wildavsky, 1961: 185). The need to investigate agencies on 
an individual basis was evident to Wildavsky; a behavioral and 
participant-observational approach was necessary to comprehend the full 
set of variables that explain budgetary success and failure accurately 
(Wildavsky, 1975: 47-65). Furthermore, understanding the dynamics of 
political power and its application in the congressional budget process was 
the key, " ... the obvious truth [is] that the budget is inextricably linked to 
the political system" (Wildavsky, 1961: 185). 
The theory Wildavsky sought would have to be successful in, 
" ... accounting for the operation and outcomes [ emphasis added] of the 
budgetary process. A theory to explain budgetary effectiveness and 
influence would describe the power relationships among the participants, 
explain why some agents are more successful than others in achieving 
their budgetary goals, state the conditions under which various strategies 
are or are not efficacious, and in this way account for the pattern of 
budgetary decisions" (Wildavsky, 1961: 189). He developed the notion 
of agency "fair share" and suggested inquiry into how this standard might 
be defined. "The opportunities for comparison are ample, the outcomes 
are specific and quantifiable, and a dynamic quality is assured by virtue 
of the comparative ease with which one can study the development of 
budgetary items over a period of years" (Wildavsky, 1961: 190). 
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Wildavsky's emphasis on power, influence, strategy and contingent 
response capacity have provided standards as well as criteria to evaluate 
the outcomes of budget reform initiatives. Wildavsky's definition of what 
would constitute good theory identifies the very essence of what he sought 
to achieve in conducting the research on budget theory and reform. He 
envisioned development of a comprehensive, empirically validated, 
descriptive theory, "[t]he point is that ... until we know something about 
the 'existential situation' in which the participants find themselves, 
proposals for major reform must be based on woefully inadequate 
understanding" (Wildavsky, 1961: 189-90). 
PREVIOUS REFORMS AND BETfER APPROACHES 
After having conceptualized his research methodology and objectives 
in the early 1960s, Wildavsky and his research colleagues critiqued and 
rejected virtually every budgetary and related policy reform experiment 
intended to instill greater "efficiency" and "rationality" into federal 
budget decision-making in the period 1962 to 1975. Among these were 
program and zero-base budgeting, cost-benefit analysis, systems analysis 
and other management initiatives embraced by the Executive branch under 
a succession of Presidents -- and rejected or ignored in part or entirely by 
Congress. Wildavsky was trenchant in his criticism of federal government 
budget reforms and analytical methodologies of this era, particularly when 
armed with evidence that they had been abandoned by their political 
sponsors or successors in the executive and Congress. Members of 
Congress and staffers sought his advice on proposed reforms. In response, 
Wildavsky clarified the specifics of the changes proposed, he made the 
objectives of the reformers clear, then he explained why they would fail 
and, typically, why they should fail (Wildavsky, 1966a; 1966b; 1969; 
1975). 
Wildavsky was ever critical of "rational and systematic" analytical 
methodologies to assist decision-making. He preferred policy analysis as 
a means of "speaking truth to power" (Wildavsky, 1979). Other critics 
of budgeting made claims about the significance of the analytical reforms 
of the 1960s. For example, Allen Schick professed that the contribution 
of PPBS was such that after it, " ... the ethos of budgeting will shift from 
justification to analysis. To far greater extent ... budget decisions will be 
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influenced by explicit statements of objectives and by a formal weighing 
of the costs and benefits" (Schick, 1966: 258). Wildavsky's response was 
to demonstrate some of the limitations of the "rational instruments" of 
PPBS, systems analysis and the tools of economic analysis generally. He 
concluded, "[s]tudies based on efficiency criteria are much needed and 
increasingly useful. My quarrel is not with them ... I have been concerned 
that a single value ... could triumph over other values without explicit 
consideration [of] others. I would feel much better if political rationality 
were . . . pursued with the same vigor and capability as is economic 
efficiency. In that case I would have fewer qualms about extending 
efficiency studies into the decision-making apparatus. My purpose [is] to 
emphasize that economic rationality, however laudable ... ought not to 
swallow up political rationality - but it will do so if political rationality 
continues to lack trained and adept defenders" (Wildavsky, 1966a: 309-
310). 
Subsequently, Wildavsky extended his criticism of program 
budgeting. "We all accept the need for better policy analysis ... [to 
provide] information that contributes to making an agency politically and 
socially relevant. .. [it] sifts alternative means and ends in the elusive 
pursuit of policy recommendations . . . it seeks knowledge and 
opportunities for coping with an uncertain future ... policy analysis is a 
variant of planning ... a tool of social change ... [and it] is expensive in 
... time, talent, and money." The problem with program budgeting to 
Wildavsky was simply that, "No one can do PPBS ... no one knows how 
to do it ... [it] cannot be stated in operational terms" (Wildavsky, 1969: 
189-191). 
The inability to perform PPB, combined with the fact that in 
Wildavsky's view it did not accommodate contingency easily, meant that 
program budgeting could not comply with the demands of the politics of 
budgeting. "The reason for the difficulty is that telling an agency to adopt 
program budgeting means telling it to find better policies and there is no 
formula for doing that ... one can (and should) talk about measuring 
effectiveness, estimating costs, and comparing alternatives, but that is a 
far cry from . . . formulating better policy" (Wildavsky, 1969: 193). 
Policy, and policy analysis," ... cannot be specified in advance for all 
agencies ... policy analysis takes time -- can seldom respond to the day to 
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day emergencies typical of budgeting. Rather, it builds the long-term 
knowledge base of an agency" (Wildavsky, 1969: 199). Policy analysis 
conducted properly could lead to increased decision rationality and better 
budgeting: "In many ways the times are propitious for policy analysis ... 
Whether or not there is sufficient creativity in us to devise better policies 
remains to be seen. If we are serious about improving public policy, we 
will go beyond the fashionable pretense of PPBS to show others what the 
best policy analysis can achieve" (Wildavsky, 1969: 200). The search for 
budget reform really was a search for better policy. 
Wildavsky's prescriptions for budgetary reform grew as a result of 
collaborative research with Arthur Hammond on the Department of 
Agriculture (Hammond and Wildavsky, 1965) and from a series of 
research projects that produced co-authored articles and books published 
from the mid-1960s through the 1970s. The literature on public budgeting 
at this time revealed an absence of work on international experience. 
Naomi Caiden and Wildavsky found that strategic behavior in the budget 
process was not singularly an American phenomenon (Caiden and 
Wildavsky, 1974). Strategic behavior occurred in a variety of budget 
processes in rich and poor countries, as well as at sub-national levels in 
the U.S. (Meltsner and Wildavsky, 1970). Caiden and Wildavsky found 
that the kinds of strategies and their frequency as well as their departure 
from desired budgetary practices varied with the wealth and predictability 
of the jurisdiction. Where fiscal conditions are poor and the fiscal future 
is certain, strategies are least used and most moderate. Everyone knows 
what will be available and extreme strategic effort is not needed. Revenue 
budgeting prevails. 
Caiden and Wildavsky concluded that strategies are used most is 
where uncertainty is greatest, namely in poorer countries where the fiscal 
environment is uncertain and changing. Fiscal guardians must constantly 
shift position -- hold back money -- to keep the country liquid, and 
spending agencies are constantly rejustifying their budgets because they 
fear that the Treasury will take back the money. The rich and certain 
countries do less strategy making in this framework, because wealth and 
certainty lead to norms of expected behavior and desirable conduct. 
Those who break these norms, e.g., by padding, can be easily identified 
and punished. Caiden and Wildavsky discussed other variations in the 
pattern of wealth and certainty, observing that in like circumstances 
people will behave in similar ways. 
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The fundamental sameness around the world of budgetary strategies 
flows from the functional equivalents of budgetary processes, because 
everywhere there are those who want more than they can get, and others 
whose business is to show them that they cannot have it. "Balancing these 
competing claims is not easy. Profound differences in role and task 
reinforce the struggle for power between Finance and Planning" 
(Wildavsky, 1975: 155). 
The most prominent theme of this book is that the numbers planned 
and printed in the budgets of poor countries do not mean much, in part 
because they are based upon revenue expectations that are highly 
uncertain. Caiden and Wildavsky demonstrated that in these nations 
budgets were weak predictors of actual spending both in terms of total 
expenditures and programmatic distribution of spending. Their thesis set 
the standard against which work in this field was to be tested. 
Wildavsky also collaborated with Arnold Meltsner in research on city 
budgeting (Meltsner and Wildavsky, 1970). Municipal budget and policy 
reform recommendations resulting from this work and applicable to 
federal budgeting as well include the following: 
- Most budgeting should maintain a line-item orientation because of its 
ease of administration and its advantages for controlling spending, 
- Performance budgeting should be implemented on a selective basis 
where there is a known and predictable relationship between costs 
and unit of work measured, 
- Policy analysts working separate from budget staff and for the city 
manager should be employed to undertake short-term studies of 
major municipal policies to enhance the ability of the manager to 
exert leadership in advising the city council and administrative staff 
directors, and 
- Some elements of PPBS should be adopted, "We certainly agree with 
partisans of PPB that an emphasis on program or output can have 
several advantages. A program orientation can encourage public 
support by helping a citizen the connection between taxes ... and ... 
services . . . Moreover, PPB can encourage civil servants to be aware 
of fundamental rather than trivial questions ... [but] ... [w]e see no 
reason to accept costly parts of a system that have no short-term 
payoff on the vague grounds of possible institutionalization or 
coordination effects" (Meltsner and Wildavsky, 1970: 351-354). 
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In the Oakland Project Meltsner and Wildavsky discovered 
similarities between city budgeting and budgeting in poor countries, e.g., 
revenue uncertainty and contingency expenditure planning. "The relative 
poverty of cities has much to do with their apparent stability. Required 
to balance their budget, unable to raise revenues quickly, they may have 
many difficulties, but ability to determine where they are or are likely to 
be in the future is not one of them . . . When expectations break down ... 
then cities move to the category of the poor and uncertain, and begin to 
display forms of behavior characteristic of the so-called developing 
nations" (Wildavsky, 1975: 134). 
Meltsner and Wildavsky also discovered important differences 
between municipal and federal budgeting that pointed to potential federal 
reforms. 
The critical feature of city budgeting is that the budget must be 
balanced . . . Few strategic choices are available to municipal officials 
because spending always leans up against the politically feasible or 
constitutionally permissible rate of taxation . . . Rather than using the 
budget process for purposes of steering ... to determine new directions 
for city operations, budgeting becomes largely a maintenance activity 
... A tight revenue constraint, typical of city budgeting, would have 
profound effects at the federal level ... budgeting would have [to be] 
. . . converted from a variable sum game, the way is now in the 
federal government, to a constant sum game . . . Put another way, 
budget behavior in the federal government is demand-centered, 
whereas local governments are supply oriented ... it is difficult [at 
the federal level] ... to justify cutting one budget request on the basis 
of a limited supply of revenue (Wildavsky, 1975: 131-133). 
These findings reinforced Wildavsky's inclination to call for federal 
reform to control spending by limiting revenues and to cease the review 
and analysis of much "maintenance-oriented" federal spending on an 
annual basis. 
Subsequently, working with Hugh Hecla, Wildavsky documented the 
substantial differences between budgeting in a parliamentary system where 
the legislative and executive branches of government coincide as opposed 
to budgeting under the Constitutional separation of powers system 
employed in the U.S. (Hecla and Wildavsky, 1974). The politics of 
budgeting is substantially more public under the U.S. constitutional system 
than it is in parliamentary systems. Despite complaints about elitism and 
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decisions favoring "special interests" made behind "closed doors in 
smoke-filled rooms" so often rendered about budgeting by the U.S. 
Congress, Recio and Wildavsky demonstrated that with respect to public 
participation in budget decision-making, the openness of the decision 
process and, ultimately, service to the public good, things could be worse. 
Applying data from another context, Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) 
concluded that initiatives to increase public input to the decision process 
and to render the process more accessible to constituents should be 
incorporated into budget process reforms. 
Research completed by Wildavsky with collaborators was 
summarized and extended in the mid-1970s (Wildavsky, 1975). He 
updated arguments made earlier in support of what he termed "radical 
incrementalism" (Wilda vsky, 1966b). He reiterated that congressional 
budgeting is and should be done by many committees rather than one, that 
greater specialization versus less would improve policy and its translation 
into budgets, that congressional committees should evolve and change to 
fulfill new roles to avoid adding new committees, that participation in the 
budgetary process should be open rather than restricted to the few and 
powerful, that bureaucrats should not be allowed to block public 
participation in lobbying their causes before Congress, and that the budget 
process should be simplified (Wildavsky, 1975). 
Wildavsky rejected suggestions that the President should be allowed 
to make proportionate reductions from congressionally established ceilings 
on spending because this power would result in unwanted congressional 
appropriation padding and also cause Congress to violate its ceilings. He 
also rejected the notion of binding five-year expenditure projections as too 
confining and incapable of accommodating uncertainty. More data on 
programs and policy outcomes would not necessarily improve budgeting. 
Too much information hinders decision-making. And, he rejected again 
the call for a Joint Committee on the Budget for the same reasons he had 
rejected this idea earlier -- too much danger of elitism and inability to 
cope with so much specialized information. 
REFORM TO ACIDEVE SPENDING CONTROL AND 
A BALANCED BUDGET 
Wildavsky offered refined prescriptions on changes he thought should 
be made in federal budgeting from 1975 to work published in 1994 after 
his death. He believed that "radical incremental reform" could improve 
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the responsiveness of resource allocation decision-making to the needs and 
preferences of the American public (Wildavsky, 1966b; 1975; 1980; 
White and Wildavsky, 1989). The two procedural reforms that Wildavsky 
favored initially were continuous budgeting and the annual expenditure 
increment. The recommendation for continuous budgeting came from his 
work with Caiden on budgeting in poor nations where revenues were 
always uncertain and, consequently, projected budget numbers were 
virtually worthless as a guide for program planning and execution. The 
solution for Wildavsky (1975: 387-88) was relatively straight-forward: 
Suppose we consider accommodating to the idea of continuous 
adaptation rather than fighting it ... The basic purpose of continuous 
budgeting is to facilitate adapting to emergent problems. Some 
programs may remain in a steady state; others can be reviewed as 
often as any participant deems it necessary. Demands can be dealt 
with as they arise. If the latest move suggests a new step calling for 
changes in appropriations, a decision could be made right then and 
there. The tyranny of the annual budget -- demanding formal review 
of the programs of little immediate interest, and inhibiting action on 
programs that need immediate attention -- would be ended. 
The second reform, the annual increment, would be implemented as 
follows, "Congress first decides whether it wants to reallocate funds for 
existing programs in around a dozen major areas of policy. Then it relates 
the last $10 billion or so to its desire for new expenditures, together with 
its preferences on taxation" (Wildavsky, 1975: 402-3). This would be 
done after Congress decided how much the annual expenditure increment 
above last year's base would be; he proposed 3 % as an approximate target 
and suggested that rules should be set to compel Congress not to exceed 
the limit once set. 
By the end of the 1980s Wildavsky moderated his zeal for a balanced 
budget. His work with Joseph White (White and Wildavsky, 1989) 
further reinforced the argument for procedural reform to achieve greater 
control over spending. They concluded that the deficit was a product of 
different value systems, and the conflict and competition over these values 
in the budgetary process (with the "Pogo Principle" still much in 
evidence). They showed that the deficit served a variety of interests, not 
all of them bad or leading to undesirable consequences. They suggested 
a "moderate proposal on the deficit," i.e., that collectively we accept 
some level of deficit, at least for a while, move to reduce its size 
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marginally, and pursue deficit reduction in one "no fooling" package with 
genuine commitment to implement the cut. They cautioned in conclusion, 
"The deficit has become an all purpose weapon, used to oppose or support 
virtually any position. This is bad policy and worse analysis; it has 
paralyzed our political system. Fixated on the deficit, we ignore other 
questions" (White and Wildavsky, 1989: 575). 
Wildavsky also noted that budgeting under conditions of scarcity may 
or may not be incremental -- sometimes cuts are not distributed equally 
and predicated on the base, and we should want it to be this way. He 
argued that in the end we would have little choice but to accept this view 
(Wildavsky, 1992a). This conclusion seems to fit the circumstance of 
federal budgeting in 1996 and throughout the 1990s. 
ASSESSING THE PRESIDENTIAL LINE-ITEM VETO 
In March 1996 Congress passed and the President signed legislation 
authorizing the Presidential line-item veto effective in January 1997. 
Wildavsky had a very rigid view on the utility of the presidential line-item 
veto. He noted that it appeared to some, former Presidents Reagan and 
Bush for example, that there could be lower deficits if the U.S. President 
had item veto power. This measure permits the President to reduce or cut 
entirely the budgets of specific programs (line-items) within the 
appropriation legislation sent to him for signature into law after passage 
by Congress. We must remember that the U.S. Constitution provides all 
authority to appropriate spending to the Congress, and none to the 
President -- thus the phrase "The President proposes, Congress disposes" 
(Wildavsky, 1988: 429-437). 
Wildavsky saw reason to doubt the assertion that the line-item veto 
would reduce or control government spending significantly (Wildavsky 
and Jones, 1994: 19-20). First, he saw a very important distinction 
between the right to veto a particular item of appropriation and the right 
to let it stand but to diminish it. On the basis of U.S. state government 
experience where many governors have line-item veto authority, it might 
be assumed that because an item veto increases the power of governor it 
does decrease spending. But, he warned that governors are elected 
officials just as are legislators. They have high priority programs they 
want to spend more on if they can. In his view, a more refined analysis 
showed that in actual use in states, the item veto is generally weak in 
limiting overall government spending. However, the line item veto is 
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very strong when it comes to reducing the spending and activity of 
specific programs and agencies (Joyce, 1993). Thus, the device is 
employed as another weapon in the politics of the budgetary process and 
its application is often likely to be related intimately to political ideology 
and the trade-offs of power politics. 
At the federal level, it is possible that a President, perhaps Bill 
Clinton, would wish to spend more or less on some programs than the 
amounts appropriated by the Congress. He could use the item veto as 
leverage with Congress to persuade party leaders to cut and redistribute 
spending more in line with his priorities before the budget ever reached 
his desk. He could play "hard ball" with Congress - - he could say either. 
"You cut or add money to this or that program or I will whack out the 
things you love most," i.e., the "pork" for congressional constituents. In 
fact, President Clinton used threat and actual vetoes to accomplish his 
objectives in the lengthy negotiation over the FY 1996 budget and related 
policy reforms. 
To Wildavsky there appeared to be some other potential defects in the 
item veto. For example, state legislators seem in some instances to vote 
higher appropriations and to exercise less spending discipline because they 
can then pass on the heat and responsibility for cutting budgets to the 
governor. This allows legislators to take credit for attempting to meet the 
needs of the people while the governor catches the wrath, amplified by the 
media, of those who perceive that they have been wrongly penalized by 
item reductions. This is useful for legislators in particular when the 
legislature is controlled by one party and the governor is from the 
opposing party. 
From Wildavsky's perspective, the systematic absence of fiscal 
responsibility is not desirable in the U.S. or elsewhere. Moreover, if one 
is an advocate of increased spending to meet many worthy and unmet 
needs that cry out for attention it is a shame to do nothing about it. Faced 
with an item veto, what is a logical response? One possibility to increase 
the chances of success would be to form a larger instead of a smaller 
coalition. In the past a coalition just large enough to get expenditures 
through was needed. Under a new system with an item veto of one type 
proposed, a two-thirds majority would be required. Consequently, elected 
officials might have to promise even more spending to more potential 
program beneficiaries. Thus, it seemed quite possible to Wildavsky that 
an item veto would be met with what is described above, termed 
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"logrolling" in budgetary parlance. Larger bargaining coalitions would 
produce much higher spending. As argued subsequently, both democratic 
government and spending control would be furthered more by a rule 
requiring congressional and executive budget decision makers and 
controllers to approve or reject budgets as a whole. This, in Wildavsky's 
view, was more likely to force spending accountability and control onto 
elected officials than narrower measures such as the line item veto 
(Wildavsky and Jones, 1994). 
CONTROLLING THE DEFICIT AND THE ENTITLEMENT CHALLENGE 
Budget confrontations between President Clinton and congressional 
Republicans in 1995, 1996 and 1997 have come to a head primarily over 
how to balance the budget and how to control rapid growth in entitlement 
spending. Both the Executive and Congress have agreed that curbing the 
deficit and cutting the dramatic rate of entitlement growth is necessary 
but, they have differed over how, to what extent, and to which programs 
cuts should be applied. Addressing expenditure control in the European 
Union, Wildavsky and Jones (1994) enumerated a set of reforms that may 
be applied to the U.S. budget to curb deficits and control entitlements. 
These reforms in some instances compliment and in others contradict 
traditional norms of budgeting enumerated more than two decades ago by 
Kenneth Howard: comprehensiveness, unity, exclusiveness, specification, 
annuality, accuracy, clarity, and publicity (Howard, 1973: 5). The 
reforms are procedural but, would have serious substantive consequences, 
i.e., Congress and the President would have to change the way they 
consider and approve both discretionary and entitlement spending. These 
reforms are not just budget rule modifications; they would produce real 
changes in discretionary and direct spending, particularly for the 
beneficiaries of entitlement programs. 
Wildavsky and Jones concluded that the manner in which Congress 
reviews and decides how much to spend should be disciplined by six 
reforms: entitlement spending increases should be tied to GDP growth, 
expenditure envelopes for major entitlement and other accounts should be 
established and treated as ceilings, entitlement and other growth should be 
financed only by specific revenue increases, automatic entitlement 
indexing should be eliminated, options for marginal reduction in 
entitlement spending should be considered, and budgets for both 
discretionary and direct accounts should be approved or rejected as a 
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whole rather than as a piecemeal set of authorizations and appropriations 
(Wildavsky and Jones, 1994: 7). 
The first reform, that entitlement spending should not be allowed to 
grow at a rate higher than the growth of gross domestic product, may be 
implemented in a very straight-forward way: take last year's expenditures 
and multiply by the percentage increase, or decrease, in the GDP. This 
rule could be applied through the instructions provided to committees of 
Congress in the Budget Resolution, with compliance by appropriations 
committees for discretionary programs and authorizing committees for 
entitlements. 
The second reform is that subceilings should be established on major, 
traditional spending accounts in both the direct and the discretionary 
portions of the federal budget, and the number of accounts should be 
reduced. Holding committees of Congress to Budget Resolution 
subceilings by account is absolutely critical and was a central part of the 
1990 Budget Enforcement Act. However, efforts to balance the budget 
using a single measure such as the overall deficit eliminates responsibity 
and makes it impossible to enforce discipline. Too many spending 
accounts also exacerbate the control problem. In the federal budget 
thirteen discretionary spending appropriations is too many. The direct 
spending side is dominated by five large entitlement programs but there 
are numerous others. Some of these should be combined because the 
proliferation of entitlements has added to the control problem. 
The third reform is continuation of the PA YGO principle adopted for 
entitlements in the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, earlier known as the 
offset procedure (Doyle and Mccaffery, 1991), and application of trade-
off budgeting in the discretionary accounts. The PAYGO rule requires 
that within sub-account congressional committee members may do 
whatever they can agree on within existing revenues. But, if they wish to 
exceed that amount then they must either agree on a revenue increase of 
some kind or find some other account, and its beneficiaries, to cut 
spending for reallocation. This is seldom easy to do, but under this 
approach at least everybody understands that sacrifice is required. What 
the PAYGO rule does, when taken together with sub-ceilings, is modify 
some fundamental rules of rationality in budgeting (Doyle and McCaffery, 
1991). It attempts to make collective sacrifice worthwhile. It means that 
the sponsors of one account and their beneficiaries cannot reach into other 
accounts to fund whatever they want. Mutual consent and sacrifice are 
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necessary. Here, rationality means facing up to opportunity costs. This 
is the essence of budgeting, and budgeting is a political process. By 
conducting bargaining within these rules explicit trade-offs have to be 
made. This is as much rationality as one should expect from any 
government. 
The fourth reform is no provision in discretionary or direct accounts 
of automatic inflation price indexing. Inflation adjustments for the budget 
year are established according to projections of a number of economic and 
factors. The British used to practice what was referred to as volume 
budgeting: spenders were promised whatever it took to carry out last 
year's policy at this year's prices. They discarded this approach as 
unfundable. In the U.S. we are still doing what the British long ago 
abandoned and for good reason. The idea to provide the same volume of 
services is laudable. However, the consequences of embracing inflation 
are problematic. It is desirable for congressional authorization and 
appropriation committees to inquire of executive branch administrators 
why, if there is 3 % inflation, efficiencies cannot be achieved to absorb 
this amount rather than to have this amount given automatically by 
formula. This reform is designed to increase the power of budget 
decision-makers as controllers of those who spend. 
The fifth reform applies strictly to direct spending. It is that the 
government enact authority to reduce selective or total entitlement 
spending by a certain amount annually, e.g., 1 or 2 % a year, or an 
amount negotiated annually between the President and Congress similar 
to what was attempted in 1995 for FY 1996 and beyond. Support for this 
reform stems from the view that the burden of sacrifice between the 
citizen and the government has become unbalanced. The norm used to be 
that the government helps the citizen and the citizen helps sustain 
government. Now, as the rules that have evolved over time, government 
does more to sustain citizens but citizens do less to sustain government. 
Thirty years or so ago there were no cost of living increases written into 
federal budget legislation. Because there was little or no inflation, it was 
unnecessary to have provisions to manage it. However, when high 
inflation rates were produced by the oil supply "crisis" of 1973, the value 
of entitlements for citizens was eroded. Before indexing, the government 
had greater discretion in responding to inflation. Politicians could come 
back and argue for and vote in favor of tax increases to finance increases 
in entitlement spending to compensate for inflation, and get public support 
for doing so. Also, due to high inflation, "bracket creep" occurred, 
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pushing people into higher tax brackets. Of course, the value of what 
they could buy was diminished. Bracket creep increased tax rates for 
many citizens as their incomes rose. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
bracket creep gave the government about 1.6 times the amount of tax 
revenue for every one percentage point increase in the price index 
(Wildavsky and Jones, 1994: 17). 
The point is that the rules of the game under traditional budgeting 
were established to protect government. It received more revenue from 
inflation and it could chose to have less spending. But, entitlement 
indexing against inflation and indexing of tax brackets was established. 
The result has been to take away budgetary flexibility from the 
government. And, because of automatic indexing, the opportunity to gain 
credit with the voting public through entitlement increase voting by 
members of Congress has been greatly diminished. With galloping 
incrementalism increasing the size of the budgetary base rapidly, and with 
entitlements threatening to squeeze out other programs, politicians are 
excoriated regardless of what they do. Critics demand that the budget 
must be balanced, the beneficiaries and their sponsors in government and 
Congress demand that entitlement and other spending continue to keep 
pace with inflation at minimum, and the public will not accept tax 
increases for any reason. Meeting all these demands is impossible in the 
first place, but elected officials no longer have the political leverage or 
resources available even to fail in attempting to satisfy them. 
However, under a reform where there is no automatic inflation 
premium and another that permits cuts in entitlement spending unless a 
PA YGO revenue increase is accepted, decision-makers would have 
several percent (e.g., 5 % ) more per year to allocate for spending or 
deficit reduction. This is probably as much as any government would 
attempt to reallocate in any particular year under any circumstance short 
of war. Further, it may be argued that interest groups would have less 
power to influence inflation allocation adjustments than is the case 
presently. It may be argued as well that elimination or automatic inflation 
adjustments and curtailing direct spending would give government budget 
decision-makers more credibility in the eyes of the voting public than 
interest groups. 
The sixth reform is intended to affirm governmental responsibility 
and accountability. Budgets should be voted up or down as a whole. This 
rule should not be burdened with excessive complexity. The greater the 
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control decision-makers have over the budget, the better the chances are 
for achieving spending control in both discretionary and direct accounts. 
It is by no means certain that the federal government will be long 
dedicated to budget deficit control. However, if government is not so 
dedicated under circumstances of high deficits and fiscal restraint, it is 
unlikely that reform by any set of rules will achieve this purpose. 
Having the budget voted upon as a single, omnibus measure is 
intended to increase the visibility to the public of the achievements and 
compromises made in negotiations over budget priorities, and the degree 
of fiscal responsibility negotiated in the match between revenues and 
expenditures. Opponents of this proposal will argue that omnibus budget 
bills in fact reduce visibility and accountability. Omnibus appropriation 
and reconciliation bills were sent to the President in the early and mid-
1980s and as recently as 1995 as Congress tried to exert its political 
priorities and will over the President. President Reagan was particularly 
incensed by this practice and warned that he would veto omnibus 
measures without hesitation. President Clinton showed a greater 
willingness to compromise on large, if not omnibus, spending legislation 
(the welfare reform act the best example) with Congress in 1996 for FY 
1997 than in 1995-96, a posture not surprising given that he faced a run 
for reelection. 
For this last reform to work, Presidents have to perceive that 
negotiating omnibus appropriations and reconciliation bills with Congress, 
strengthened by the line-item veto authority, will allow them to make their 
priorities more palatable and attractive to the American public. Presidents 
would have to desire greater accountability for their decisions. This 
reform also would require Congress to be more willing to negotiate with 
the President over policy and spending priorities before enactment of 
omnibus legislation (at the authorization and appropriation conference 
committee stage at the latest) rather than holding the budget hostage in 
assault of Executive authority. 
A fine example of such an attack occurred in 1995 and early 1996 
over the FY 1996 budget. To enact their Contract with America, 
Congressional Republicans wanted to strike a total budget and 
reconciliation agreement with the President. However, President Clinton 
and his advisors found much to dislike in the package they were asked to 
approve. The result was stalemate over how to balance the budget. 
Debate on budget balancing continues along these lines for the FY 1998 
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budget and the out-years. The President has proposed a dubious balanced 
budget with the tough decisions postponed until he is out of office. This 
forces the hand of Congress to come up with a better plan and to sell it to 
the public, a formidable challenge. It is far easier to defend the status quo 
in budgetary politics than to force the issue of expenditure control where 
substantial programmatic and spending changes are needed to achieve the 
desired end. Reform advocates are thus left to wonder about the political 
incentives needed to cause the President and Congress to implement 
procedural changes of the type advocated in this article. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Aaron Wildavsky provided many keys to understanding budgeting 
and budget reform. Wildavsky recognized budgeting as a process 
characterized by continuous, evolutionary change and reform. Within the 
framework of incrementalism, he told us what should be done to better 
control spending, how to do it, and how efforts to do it should be 
evaluated. He lamented the dissensus over budgetary norms and policy 
so evident in present day budget competition compared to the "classical 
era" of budgeting, but he told us that the budget process was the victim 
and not the problem. In testimony before Congress, he argued in writing 
(White and Wildavsky, 1989; Wildavsky, 1992b; Wildavsky and Jones, 
1994) and elsewhere that better budgeting through expenditure limits, 
curbing the growth or even accepting marginal reductions in entitlements, 
could become part of the solution -- but these reforms would not offer the 
solution to the many public policy dilemmas faced by Americans 
(Wildavsky, 1992b: 439). 
Wildavsky spent much of his career arguing against a whole range of 
proposed budget and policy process reforms, explaining why they would 
not produce the results promised by their advocates. Not content with the 
role of mere critic of the views of others, he also offered 
recommendations on how federal budgeting should be changed to achieve 
results that political leaders and citizens profess they want. Yet, he was 
not a staunch defender of the status quo. Indeed, he advanced some 
ambitious procedural reforms, e.g., methods to produce a balanced budget 
and to control the growth of entitlement spending. The point upon which 
Wildavsky disagreed with many other reformers was the purpose of 
reform. He did not support procedural reform for purposes of efficiency, 
effectiveness, or better budgeting. Rather, he believed that procedural 
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reform should produce different decisions than would otherwise be made 
and should result in different outcomes. Unless outcomes were affected, 
"Why bother" with procedural reform? (Wildavsky, 1961: 186). It was 
not that he believed process did not matter. Rather, the substitution of 
procedural reform for substantive changes in policy would always be in 
vain. The process matters precisely because its affects the outcome of 
who gets what, when and how much. This, in his view, is what budgeting 
inevitably is about. 
This article has provided perspectives on Wildavsky's views on 
budget theory, why he believed pursuit of normative theory was a waste 
of time, and what he objected to in proposals of positive theory. His main 
contribution was to provide the field with valid and testable descriptive 
theory. Wildavsky believed that it was far better to comprehend budgeting 
through observation of the behavior of participants than to speculate over 
theoretical allocative questions. His theory was assembled on the basis of 
chronicling and analyzing what people actually do in competition for 
resources. Wildavsky defended many of the classical, normative 
principles of budgeting but rejected others. 
Review of his work shows that he disagreed with a number of the 
classical principles of budgeting identified by Howard (1973: 5) and 
others, among these comprehensiveness, unity, exclusiveness and 
annuality. Wildavsky demonstrated that in fact budgets were incremental 
and were passed piecemeal rather than as comprehensive packages. 
However, despite his observation that budgeting was not comprehensive, 
he recommended procedural reform to require budgets to be voted up or 
down as a whole as a means of enforcing accountability. Budgets 
certainly did not exhibit unity because of the highly differentiated nature 
of Congress as an institution, the complexity of the budget process, and 
the proclivities of committee chairs to protect their decision authority. 
Budgeting was not exclusive because it did not focus only on financial 
matters -- budgeting comprehends policy, policy on health care, policy on 
defense, policy on welfare, etc. Budgeting is not just taxing and 
spending. Budgeting also is not really annual. Otherwise, how would we 
account for the power of the base and its utility as a valid and reliable 
predictive variable? These normative principles were not valid in 
Wildavsky's view because they do not fit with actual congressional and 
executive branch budget practice as he observed it. 
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Wildavsky portrayed budgeting as exhibiting, among other things, the 
following characteristics: role playing by spenders and cutters, strategic 
advocacy by spenders, strategic resistance to spending initiatives by 
budget controllers, negotiation and compromise among decision-makers, 
legislative coalition-building to achieve specific ends, complex preference 
and benefit trading among program sponsors, legislative back-scratching 
and logrolling, agency end-runs, and legislative gimmickry such as 
complex appropriation to outlay ratio estimation in deficit scorekeeping 
to permit certain types of spending but to prohibit others. He 
demonstrated that many of the normative principles of budgeting identified 
by scholars cannot and should not be adhered to because the partisan, 
fragmented and convoluted politics of the budgetary process appears to 
serve members of Congress and the executive well. Laudable efforts such 
as those to persuade Congress to forsake annual voting on the budget and 
to adopt continuous operational and capital budgeting fail because few 
members perceive they will be winners and most fear becoming losers as 
a result of this change. To persuade them that they will win rather than 
lose is the task faced by reform advocates. 
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